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 255A E S T H E T I C S  A S  S U B V E R S I O N
CINEMATOGRAPHIC AESTHETICS AS 
SUBVERSION OF MORAL REASON 
IN PASOLINI’S MEDEA 
Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky
M E D E A
While shooting Medea in July 1969 in Cappadocia – the region of Cen-
tral Anatolia where Medea’s home village of ancient Colchis was recre-
ated for the film – Pasolini wrote this into his notebook: ‘È un giorno di 
festa e di riposo. Ed ecco che dopo tanto sole, le stesse ragioni che 
rendevano questo giorno ilare, lo rendono angoscioso. Ragioni senza 
ragione.’1 
 Medea’s composition was sandwiched between Porcile and 
Appunti per un’Orestiade africana, two films which are often seen as 
Pasolini’s masterpieces. Medea, however, has not only been considered 
by some to be less successful, but even been declared a downright fail-
ure. Medea is indeed a disturbing and unsettling film. Maurizio Viano, 
for instance, refers to Maria Callas, the actress playing Medea, as the 
biggest casting mistake of Pasolini’s career. In contrast to Jason – played 
by the twenty-seven-year-old, 190-centimetre-tall triple jumper and 
Olympic medallist Giuseppe Gentile – Callas ‘was pale, middle-aged, 
frozen in a blank stupor which was meant to signify a life spent inside, 
literally and metaphorically’.2 As I shall argue, this misogynistic lapse 
can be read as a symptom of the scale of the disruptive effect produced 
by Pasolini’s film.
 Viano finds Callas’s interpretation of Medea lacking in a ‘primitive 
vitality’.3 Viano accuses Callas of appearing as someone who questions 
too much, hence as someone who is afflicted by doubt, someone with 
an intellectual life. In correspondence with cultural memory, Viano 
would have preferred to see Medea portrayed as a self-obsessed, primi-
tively vital young woman reduced to the murder of her children, at the 
mercy of her own jealousy and unaware of her actions. Pasolini’s repre-
sentation of Medea, on the other hand, is far more abyssal and multi-
faceted.
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 As the film theorist Janet L. Borgerson claims, there is something 
awry in our historical memory of Medea.4 This is precisely the point of 
departure for Pasolini’s film: he does not create an opposition between 
the world of patriarchal reason, embodied by Jason, and the matriar-
chal, irrational, archaic, and magical world personified by Medea. On 
the contrary, he shows that this opposition, like the desire for a passion-
ate, irrational, and primitively vital Medea, is itself the product of a his-
torical conception which, from the Age of Reason onward, has associ-
ated the emergence from self-incurred tutelage with the rationalization 
of sensuality and sexuality. Over the course of the nineteenth century, 
the female body was hystericized and medicalized. As Foucault has viv-
idly shown, female hysterics became objects of study of psychiatry and 
of the emerging scientia sexualis. Along with the sexually perverse, who 
were declared a separate species, they become part of an entire ‘sub-race 
race’.5
A N  U N F O U N D E D  F E A R
Pasolini’s Medea betrays her native village and her origins; she dismem-
bers her brother, kills Jason’s new bride, stabs both of her children, sets 
her house on fire, and deprives Jason of their children’s corpses. The 
disturbing nature of the film, however, does not derive from these 
actions. Rather, it is related to the fact that one does not easily cast 
moral judgement on Medea on the basis of these actions, and that the 
audience is left in a state of indifference or suspense. It therefore 
becomes difficult to project Medea back into the realm of prehistory or 
into the circle of hysterical, irrational, and mad women and perverts.
 Pasolini and Callas create a Medea whom we not only comprehend 
but who leads us to believe that her children are better off as dead 
corpses fleeing with their mother in her chariot than remaining with 
their father in Corinth. Indeed, the children are consecrated to death 
well before Medea’s final act. The children’s murder is preceded by a 
scene in which Creon, king of Corinth and father of Glauce, Jason’s 
young bride, seeks out Medea in order to ban her from the town along 
with her sons. Creon denies Medea and her sons the right of residence 
even though, as he claims, he has nothing to hold against her. The rea-
son is fear. As Creon also concedes, he fears for his daughter, and he 
fears the power of Medea’s pain. He fears that his daughter might 
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become infected and commit suicide. It is this – unfounded – fear that 
leads Creon to confer magical powers on Medea and that causes him to 
become partly responsible for the death of his daughter and of Medea 
and Jason’s sons. 
 In Medea’s moment of greatest vulnerability and weakness, when 
she realizes that Jason has definitely left her in order to marry Creon’s 
daughter Glauce, she is addressed by one of her maids: 
ANCELLA Signora, perché hai deciso di rassegnarti così?
MEDEA Che cosa dovrei fare.
ANCELLA Dicono …
MEDEA Che cosa dicono?
ANCELLA Che tu, nel tuo paese, se volevi … potevi compiere prodigi … 
dominare l’aria, il fuoco. Almeno così dice la gente qui a Corinto, e ha 
paura di te.
MEDEA Ha paura?
ANCELLA Sì, come di una maga …
The maid claims to have said all this only to help her mistress and to 
encourage her to do works of magic again, in order to take her fate into 
her own hands. At first Medea declines, claiming that she is no longer 
the same person after ten years spent in exile, but then she recollects 
herself: ‘[…] Forse hai ragione. Sono restata quella che ero. Un vaso 
pieno di un sapere non mio’ (1:06:10–1:07:30).6 
E R O S  T H A N A T O S
With his film and its cinematographic aesthetics Pasolini subverts not 
only Medea’s projection into the prehistorical world, i.e., the world of 
madmen and perverts, but also the belief in the validity of a moral 
rationality, as exemplarily elaborated and argued for by Immanuel Kant 
in his Critique of Practical Reason. Pasolini reproaches the belief in a 
world of reasons for its incomprehension of that which is without rea-
son – the unfounded, the irrational as well as the a-rational. Pasolini 
thereby conceptually builds upon Nietzsche’s artistic-philosophical 
transfiguration of Dionysus. As he writes in an open letter to Silvana 
Mangano in 1968:
Egli [Dioniso] è venuto in forma umana a Tebe per portare amore (ma 
mica quello sentimentale e benedetto dalle convenzioni!) e invece porta il 
dissesto e la carneficina. Egli è l’irrazionalità che cangia, insensibilmente e 
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nella più suprema indifferenza, dalla dolcezza all’orrore. Attraverso essa 
non c’è soluzione di continuità tra Dio e il Diavolo, tra il bene e il male 
(Dioniso si trasforma, appunto, insensibilmente e nella più suprema indif-
ferenza, dal giovane pieno di grazia che era al suo primo apparire in un 
giovane amorale e criminale). Sia come apparizione ‘benigna’ che come 
apparizione ‘maledetta’, la società, fondata sulla ragione e sul buon senso 
– che sono il contrario di Dioniso, cioè dell’irrazionalità – non lo com-
prende. Ma è la sua stessa incomprensione di questa irrazionalità che lo 
porta irrazionalmente alla rovina (alla più orrenda carneficina mai 
descritta in un’opera d’arte).7
Pasolini could also have referred to Walter Benjamin, who developed 
his critique of Kant’s rationally founded morality by highlighting Kant’s 
odd interpretation of marriage and treatment of sexuality. In his widely 
discussed fragment entitled ‘On the Programme of the Coming Philoso-
phy’ in 1917–18 Benjamin reproached Kant with failing to find a valid 
answer to the question of the dignity of an experience that is ephem-
eral.8 In his essay on Goethe’s Elective Affinities (1924–25), Benjamin 
draws on his earlier critique of the Kantian notion of experience and 
links ephemeral experience with the experience of the fateful collapse of 
love between Ottilie and Eduard, which ends in death. As Benjamin elu-
cidates with the ‘dark conclusion of love’ vividly described in Goethe’s 
novel, the idea of self-legislation reaches its limits with ephemeral expe-
rience. When love is measured according to Kant’s definition of mar-
riage as ‘the union of two persons of different sexes for the purpose of 
lifelong mutual possession of their sexual organs’,9 it must appear as 
‘naked foundering’ rather than as ‘true ransoming of the deepest imper-
fection which belongs to the nature of man himself’,10 as Benjamin 
motivates his critique of the belief in moral reason. Benjamin concedes 
that Kant has correctly grasped the subject matter of marriage. How-
ever, the moral possibility or indeed the necessity of marriage cannot be 
deduced from it. From the ‘objective nature of marriage’, as Benjamin 
objects to this interpretation of moral reason, one can ‘obviously only 
deduce its depravity’.11
 Benjamin considers the ‘dark conclusion’ of Ottilie and Eduard’s 
love as a ‘ransoming of the deepest imperfection which belongs to the 
nature of man himself’, whereby ‘imperfection’ is measured against a 
perfection which only accords with the nature of purely rational beings 
– angels. Alluding to Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which first 
appeared in 1920, Benjamin ascribes this imperfection to the workings 
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of ‘Eros Thanatos’.12 Even if Benjamin could not at that time have 
known Freud’s 1932 edition of the New Introductory Lectures on Psy-
choanalysis, he would have agreed with Freud’s thesis that phenomena 
of life proceed from the ‘concurrent and opposing action of [Eros and 
Thanatos]’ – of the erotic drives that ‘always seek to combine more and 
more living substance into ever greater unities’ and of the death drives 
‘which oppose this effort and lead what is living back into an inorganic 
state’.13 And he would have claimed – no less than Pasolini – that the 
acknowledgment and comprehension of precariousness and of imperfec-
tion, of the irrational which, to quote Benjamin once again, ‘belongs to 
the nature of man himself’, is the precondition for avoiding violence 
and destruction. 
T H E  L A S T  T H I N G S
Janet Borgerson has convincingly shown how meticulously Pasolini 
composed his film, and the precision with which he works with repeti-
tions in this composition.14 This begins with the very decision to recon-
struct ancient Colchis, Medea’s home village, in Central Anatolia – 
more specifically in Cappadocia. As Borgerson argues, this particular 
geographical detail establishes the cultural specificity to which Pasolini 
refers.15 This, in turn, allows us to explain and interpret the rituals 
staged by Pasolini in the first part of the film. 
 The film starts with a monologue by Chiron, the centaur to whom 
Jason was given after his birth. Over the course of the monologue, 
Jason first appears as a young child, then as a thirteen-year old boy, and 
finally as a young man. When Jason reaches adolescence, Chiron is 
transformed from half man and half horse into an attractive, handsome 
man who now appears as a divine messenger, mediator, and poet. Chi-
ron begins his speech with the confession that he is a liar and that he 
enjoys telling lies. Then he explains to Jason his true descent and the 
story of his origins. It is a complicated story, permeated by jealousy and 
power struggles. As Chiron impresses upon Jason, it is important that 
nothing in nature is natural, but that everything is holy. As he specifies 
to the thirteen-year old boy, everything in nature is an appearance and 
the gods not only love but also hate. And, as he finally reveals to the 
grown-up Jason, he is not only a liar but perhaps expresses himself too 
poetically for Jason. He explains this with the fact that for the ancient 
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man all myths and rituals are real experiences and they are grasped in 
their physical presence. For him, reality is a unity so perfect that the 
emotion he experiences in the stillness of a summer sky corresponds to 
the most personal and emotional experience of modern man. Pasolini 
apparently alludes here to the melancholy mood which, in the passage 
mentioned at the beginning of this essay, he had so vividly described 
during the shooting of the film as the experience of nature’s indiffer-
ence, amounting in the end to the world’s meaninglessness:
È un giorno di festa e di riposo. Ed ecco che dopo tanto sole, le stesse 
ragioni che rendevano questo giorno ilare, lo rendono angoscioso. Ragioni 
senza ragione. Forse il primo segmento della curva declinante che il sole 
fatalmente percorre particolarmente impartecipe in terre straniere. Si 
comincia allora ad affrontare in modo diretto le cose, come il bambino che 
in quelle ore piangeva per nevrosi. Intorno c’era l’Appennino, ma, per la 
verità, il sole aveva questa stessa indifferenza per chi l’implorava. Seguiva 
la sua strada, ecco tutto.16
Pasolini here describes the appearance of a world which has stopped 
speaking to man, a world without myth but also without poetry, a 
world without meaning in which the last remaining resort is neurosis. 
 After the short excursus in which Pasolini uses the figure of Chiron 
to inform the audience of the poetology framing the film – or also to 
inform the audience that the question of a Poetry of Cinema constitutes 
a central question of the film – Chiron tells Jason that he has a right to 
the throne of Pelias in Iolkos, but that he will be given the task of recov-
ering the Golden Fleece. Jason will go to a remote land, where he will 
find a world which is far from our imaginings. This land is very real, 
very realistic and therefore very mythical. Through Chiron’s speech, 
Pasolini once more prepares us for what comes next: the rituals which 
have been created with the development of agriculture, and the discov-
ery that seeds lose their form beneath the earth to be born again. As 
Chiron explains to Jason, they represent the last things, the resurrec-
tion. However, this knowledge is no longer of any use to Jason, because 
what he sees in the seeds and in their resurrection no longer bears any 
meaning. This knowledge is, as Chiron says, no more than a distant 
memory. For, as Chiron concludes, ‘in fact there is no god’ (8:27).
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I N  T H E  W O R L D  O F  M E M O R Y  A N D  D R E A M S
The scene is followed by a jump cut and we are in Cappadocia, Medea’s 
mythical world. We first see two goats, then the image opens up and the 
camera shows several people from behind and follows them – a man in 
a bright woollen gown, some women in capes. A rocky landscape. 
Sacral stones. All is still, no one speaks until the foreign-sounding and 
deeply penetrating music, which Pasolini had chosen together with Elsa 
Morante, commences: sacral Japanese music and Iranian love songs. 
Once again, people walk across the image, followed a short distance by 
the camera. There is a quick succession of medium long shots, long 
shots and extremely long shots. We see a scene of animals and men, 
moving or standing still; they seem to be waiting for something. It all 
seems like an ethnographical film. The only missing element is the insis-
tent voice-over so characteristic of Jean Rouch’s films, which might 
have served as Pasolini’s inspiration here. And perhaps it is also for this 
reason that everything is dream-like or, to cite Pasolini himself, as if in a 
‘world of memory and dreams’.17 From the point of view of cinemato-
graphic aesthetics, the scene seems familiar and unknown at the same 
time, near and temporally distant, surreal because of the music and the 
absence of speech.
 In his 1965 essay ‘The Cinema of Poetry’, Pasolini introduces the 
term ‘im-sign’ (imsegno) in order to distinguish signifying images from 
the linguistic carriers of meaning, the ‘lin-signs’ (linsegni). He claims 
that ‘every attempt at memorization is a series of “im-signs”, that is, 
primarily a cinema sequence’.18 All dreams, he argues, ‘are a series of 
im-signs which have all the characteristics of the filmic sequence: close-
ups, long shots, etc.’ In other words, there is an affinity between dream, 
cinema and memory which is based on cinematic technique. These are 
mechanisms which move at the limit of humanity, which for Pasolini 
means that they are ‘pre-grammatical’ or ‘premorphological’ mecha-
nisms. And from this he concludes that ‘the linguistic instrument on 
which cinema is founded’, or the series of im-signs is ‘of an irrational 
type’, which in turn explains the ‘profoundly oniric nature of cinema’ as 
well as ‘its absolutely and inevitably […] objective status’.19 As we can 
infer from the last sentence, there is not only an affinity between dreams 
and cinema, but also between cinema and what Pasolini describes as the 
nature of myth in Medea. On this basis it becomes clear that Pasolini 
joins Mircea Eliade’s description of religious-historical rituals and ico-
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nographies to the cinema of poetry, operating against a background of 
philosophy and the aesthetics of film.20 The linkage between cinematic 
technique and dream mechanisms – between memory and myth – cre-
ates a cinematic and aesthetic basis on which to violate ‘the code’ (to 
cite Pasolini himself).21 In the case of Medea, to violate the code means 
to displace Medea’s historical and cultural memory and thereby to upset 
the belief in the validity of moral reason.
 Medea provides a nearly exemplary illustration of what Deleuze 
asserts concerning modern film when he writes: ‘It is as if, speech hav-
ing withdrawn from the image to become founding act, the image, for 
its part, raised the foundations of space, the “strata”, those silent pow-
ers of before or after speech, before or after man.’22 As Deleuze shows 
for modern cinema, and as is exemplified by Medea, the visual image 
becomes ‘archaeological, stratigraphic, tectonic’. Hence it becomes even 
more important to consider the following claim that Deleuze makes: 
‘Not that we are taken back to prehistory (there is an archaeology of 
the present), but to the deserted layers of our time which bury our own 
phantoms; to the lacunary layers which we juxtaposed according to 
variable orientations and connections.’23 Moreover, what Deleuze 
writes about Pasolini’s cinema in rediscovering the lacunary layers in 
the images of the desert is even more relevant for Medea than for Teo-
rema, Deleuze’s primary reference. ‘There are the deserts of Pasolini, 
which make prehistory the abstract poetic element, the “essence” co-
present with our history, the archaean base which reveals an intermina-
ble history beneath our own.’24
F E T I S H E S  E V E R Y W H E R E
No one looks into the camera, not even the royal couple, who watch 
the preparations in their artful costumes, or Medea’s brother who 
stands next to them in a blue gown. A procession is formed; a sun 
wheel woven from grain is worn on top of their heads: fetishes every-
where. The camera then follows the gaze of Medea’s brother upon the 
procession. He lowers his eyes and walks away. The camera stays with 
him. He goes into the field and sits down, the camera pans over the 
rocks and after a cut it stops at the body of a young man who is sus-
pended by the arms and clad only in a loincloth. One more step and we 
see the Callas/Medea portrait for the first time, and the camera follows 
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her glance with a countershot on the victim, who is now shown in a 
medium shot. People outside are waiting; they are prepared for the rit-
ual, lined up and well equipped. They carry sacral objects, there is a fig-
ure reminiscent of the Madonna, and next to it there is grain and a dead 
rat suspended by its tail. The victim is led out of the caves. He 
exchanges glances with Medea and with the members of the royal fam-
ily. The procession starts moving and, despite the fact that these fetishes 
don’t originate in Christianity, it is reminiscent of a Christian proces-
sion.
 Cappadocia, indeed, was not only home to the Phrygian Cult of 
Cybele, but was also the place where Saint Paul took refuge and 
founded one of the first Christian settlements. The first Christians 
carved more than one thousand churches into the rocks surrounding 
Goreme, Ihlara and Soganli, places well known for their frescoes and 
where Pasolini in turn projected Medea’s story. Jason appears to Callas/
Medea in one of these churches with well-preserved and easily visible 
Christian frescoes. In the film, the church represents the sanctuary 
where the Golden Fleece is kept. Pasolini had already intensely studied 
the place and its history while conducting research for a film he had 
planned to shoot about Saint Paul in the mid-1960s.25
 There is a significant shift of focus – a close-up and countershot 
with distinctly erotic allusions between Medea’s brother and the victim. 
The killing of the victim on a wooden cross, ritually painted all over the 
body, constitutes one of the film’s climaxes. Once again there is a super-
imposition of Christian imagery and antique sacrificial rituals, recalling 
the fact that ‘the last things’ (eschatology) and the resurrection are at 
the centre of both. The dead body is chopped up: the blood and the 
individual pieces of flesh are taken to the land and fields where the 
blood is distributed among the trees, plants and crops, while the flesh 
itself is buried. The bodily remains are burnt in a fire, whose smoke is 
also dispersed across the fields. It is only now that Medea utters her 
first sentence: ‘Give life to the seed and be reborn with the seed’ (‘Da’ la 
vita al seme e rinasci col seme’) (21:40). The scene is followed by a 
lively masked celebration, which is once more strongly influenced by 
ethnological cinema. 
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L O V E  W I T H O U T  T H E  B L E S S I N G  O F  C O N V E N T I O N 
The cult of Cybele, which originated in the time of the Phrygians in the 
9th century BCE, was still celebrated in the Roman Empire when Paul 
was evangelizing in Cappadocia. It was a cult of mourning for an obses-
sive love which neither enjoyed the blessing of convention, to cite Paso-
lini, nor corresponded to the pragmatism of Kant’s definition of mar-
riage. Nor did it conform to the romantic ideal of love opposed to this 
form of pragmatism. It dealt with a form of love which is focused on 
bodily desire. More specifically, it is about the female desire for the 
masculine body, which is realized in the cinematographic visual 
arrangements of Pasolini’s staging of Medea’s love for Jason, and which 
is also thematized in some of the dialogues – for instance when, towards 
the end of their love, Jason accuses Medea of having based everything 
she has done for him on her love for his body. In this accusation it 
becomes clear not only how contorted and outrageous this love is from 
the perspective of a heteronormative regime, but also how distant Jason 
is from the uncompromising love which dictates Medea’s thought and 
actions, and which is mourned in the cult of Cybele.
 Cybele was first worshipped in Phrygenia and later in Greece and 
Rome as the Goddess of Earth. Similar to the myth of Demeter with the 
figure of Baubo, the myth of Cybele also includes the motif of hermaph-
roditism. Unlike Demeter’s companion Baubo, however, Agdistis is not 
a creature in his own right, but part of the very story of Cybele: he is 
she in a different temporal stratum. The androgynous Agdistis was seen 
as frightening and therefore castrated by Dionysus following a ruling of 
the gods. The emasculated Agdistis was transformed into Cybele, and 
from Agdistis’ severed genitals grew Attis. Cybele and Attis became lov-
ers and everything went well until Attis decided to marry someone else. 
Cybele avenged herself by striking the entire wedding party, as well as 
Attis, with madness, whereupon he castrated himself under a pine tree. 
When Cybele learnt of Attis’ death she fell into a profound state of 
mourning and founded an orgiastic and ecstatic cult of mourning and 
lamentation which met in March every year.
 Pasolini’s Medea bears the memory of the myth of Cybele. Her love 
for Jason is unconditional and this unconditionality is shared by her 
brother. He not only helps to steal the Fleece but also desires Jason. 
When returning to Jason and the Argonauts with Medea and the 
Golden Fleece, he beholds Jason with the same desire as Medea. And of 
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course it is the gaze of Pasolini’s camera that merges with the audience’s 
own gaze (59:30).
 The cult of Cybele is originally the cult of mourning for an irrevers-
ible loss. In Pasolini’s Medea, this loss and mourning are omnipresent. 
They are intensified in the representation of Glauce who, as Pasolini 
illustrates in an oniric repetition of the scene in which Medea’s children 
hand over their mother’s wedding dress to Jason’s new bride, glances 
into a mirror and kills herself in a bout of melancholy. It is not Medea’s 
magical powers which kill Glauce, but, rather, the pain over the loss of 
an uncompromising love, which in the end is the love of life.
 This ancient pain is masterfully represented by Maria Callas in the 
role of Medea. Her gesture and acting originate in nineteenth-century 
opera. Hers is a body fallen silent in the midst of song. Her affiliation 
with such a different medium makes Callas/Medea appear even more 
extraneous, sublime and distant. Medea is a disturbing film that blurs 
the boundaries between hysterics, those who are made objects of psy-
chiatry, the sexually perverse, and ‘ourselves’. This is why it is an 
important film and a profound work of art.
Translated by Katrin Wehling-Giorgi
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